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Abstract The dynamics of adoption of innovations is an important subject in many fields and areas,
like technological development, industrial processes, social behavior, fashion or marketing. The number of
adopters of a new technology generally increases following a kind of logistic function. However, empirical
data provide evidences that this behavior may be more complex, as many factors influence the decision to
adopt an innovation. On the one hand, although some individuals are inclined to adopt an innovation if
many people do the same, there are others who act in the opposite direction, trying to differentiate from
the “herd”. People who prefer to behave like the others are called mimetic, whereas individuals who resist
adopting new products, the stronger the greater the number of adopters, are named contrarians. On the
other hand, new adopters may have second thoughts and change their decisions accordingly. Agents who
regret and abandon their decision will be denominated repentant. In this paper we investigate a simple
model for the adoption of an innovation for a society composed by mimetic and contrarian individuals
whose decisions depend mainly on three elements: the appeal of the novelty, the inertia or resistance to
adopt it, and the social interactions with other agents. In the process, agents can repent and turn back to
the old technology. We present analytic calculations and numerical simulations to determine the conditions
for the establishment of the new technology. The inclusion of repentant agents modify the balance between
the global incentive to adopt and the number of contrarians who prevent full adoption, generating a rich
landscape of temporal evolution that includes cycles of adoption.
PACS. 89.65.Ef Social organizations; anthropology – 89.75.Fb Structures and organization in complex
systems – 89.65.Gh Economics; econophysics
1 Introduction
Innovation is at the core of the changing in living con-
ditions all along the human history. It is also one of the
main driving forces of sustainable economical development
in modern societies. However, even when innovations may
represent a clear improvement over existing technologies,
its adoption is not guaranteed because it depends on other
factors that can restrain the adoption process, like the in-
dividual resistance or a high price. Besides, the adoption
may be boosted by means of advertising or interpersonal
influence. Rogers [1] was the first one to address the prob-
lem of innovation adoption. In his qualitatively descrip-
tion, he claims that adoption curves are S-shaped (logis-
tic) as a function of time: there are few early adopters, and
only when their number becomes larger than a threshold,
adoption develops up to a saturation point.
Systems of heterogeneous interacting individuals are
complex systems whose properties have been studied in
the contexts of economics (see [2,3,4] and references therein),
criminality [5], game theory [6], and in many other social
and biological systems. It has been shown that when the
individuals are mimetic, i.e. they choose to imitate the
behavior of the others (also called herding or congregator
behavior), the possible equilibria have well known proper-
ties [7,8]. If some individuals do not exhibit a mimetic be-
havior, adoption dynamics is more involved, but also more
interesting. Such individuals, called contrarians, have been
described in different contexts in the literature. Galam
[9] introduced contrarian agents in voter models, in such
a way that they adopt opinions that are systematically
opposite to the one of the majority of their neighbors.
Other possibilities have been proposed more recently by
Masuda [10], who considered different models in which the
decision of each contrarian depends on its neighborhood
(made of contrarians and/or mimetics). It is also possible
to have indifferent agents, who are not aware of the social
tendencies. As we want to focus on the role of repentants
in the dynamics of innovation adoption we do not consider
indifferent agents in the present contribution.
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With or without contrarians, the time evolution of the
fraction of adopters is a Markov chain: n(t+1) = F(n(t)).
The fixed points attractors of the dynamics satisfy n =
F(n). However, as demonstrated by Goles et al. [11], sys-
tems with interacting binary agents evolve toward fixed
points only when the interactions are symmetric and pos-
itive. Negative symmetric interactions may lead either to
fixed points or to cycles of length 2, depending on details
of the dynamics and on the initial state. These results
rely on the existence of an energy function that is a de-
creasing (more rigorously, non-increasing) function of time
under the system’s dynamics. However, a system with
contrarians does not necessarily have an underlying en-
ergy function, because the interactions between mimetic
agents and contrarian agents are not symmetric. Being
an individual property, contrarians have negative inter-
actions with all other agents. Thus, interactions between
contrarians are symmetric —both being negative— but
interactions between a contrarian and a mimetic agent
are anti-symmetric. Consequently, the existence of fixed
points is not guaranteed.
A “microscopic” model of adoption dynamics has been
proposed recently [12]. This model considers heterogeneous
individuals in the presence of advertising. Mimetic indi-
viduals have a positive interaction with the adopters, in-
creasing their pay-off function with the fraction of them.
Contrarians, instead, have the opposite behavior, with a
preference to adopt that decreases when the fraction of
adopters increases. In that model, adopters, both mimet-
ics and contrarians, cannot change their minds, so that the
fraction of adopters is a non-decreasing function of time.
The dynamics of adoption in models with only mimetic
individuals has been studied by Bass [7] and also by Phan
et al. [13] for different types of networks. In Ref. [13] au-
thors have shown that the fraction of adopters increases
with time through avalanches that depend on the underly-
ing network structure. Moreover, the fraction of adopters
at equilibrium in the absence of contrarians has been ob-
tained analytically in [12] for a uniform distribution of
the resistance to adopt and small values of the interac-
tion weights. Numerical results have been obtained when
contrarians are included: in the context of innovation the
most important consequence of the inclusion of contrar-
ians is the non-trivial restraining effect on the adoption
curves, i.e, a small fraction of contrarians produce a large
reduction on the final fraction of adopters. Gonc¸alves et
al. model [12] is suitable for situations where users can
not change their decisions, such as the case of expensive
technologies. But there are other situations, as for exam-
ple the choice of an operating system, a software, or an
internet supplier, where the decision can be revised peri-
odically. In such cases, adopters may change their minds
and abandon the innovation.
In this article we will focus on a society where individ-
uals exhibit a mimetic or contrarian behavior (kept fixed
during the whole adoption process), but they can repent
for their decisions, going back to a non-adopter state. We
will study this model using analytical and numerical ap-
proaches, and considering different distributions of the id-
iosyncratic resistance to adopt. We explore the parameters
space by comparing the results of simulations with a mean
field analytic approach, analyzing the phase diagram of
the system for different proportions of mimetics and con-
trarians. The paper is organized as follows: In section I
we present the model, in section II we consider a uniform
distribution of the resistance to adopt (analytically and
numerically), and in section III we analyze the case of a
logistic distribution. Conclusions are presented in section
IV.
2 The model of adoption with social
interactions
We consider a system of N individuals that must decide
whether to adopt or not a novelty. We define a parame-
ter A ≥ 0 as a global incentive to adopt, the same for all
agents. This incentive is proportional to the advantages
introduced by the new technology, to advertising, and to
eventual social values associated with the possession of the
new product. On the other hand, each individual has a re-
sistance to adopt the innovation given by a value R + ri
(1 ≤ i ≤ N), where R is the population’s average and
the ri are (quenched) idiosyncratic deviations distributed
among the population according to a probability density
function P(r) of zero mean and variance s. In [12] P(r) is
uniform in [−r0, r0] with R = 0.5, r0 = 0.5 and s = r20/3.
This resistance can be associated to suspicion against the
novelty, to a certain laziness that induces to remain with
the old technology or to limited resources for the acqui-
sition of the new technology. When confronted with the
decision to adopt or not the new technology, we assume
that there are two kinds of individuals: a fraction f of the
population is composed by contrarian agents, i.e., they re-
sist to imitate what others do, while a fraction 1−f of the
population is mimetic, so they tend to follow the herd. We
assume these attitudes also remain fixed during the adop-
tion process. At each time step, each agent weights the
expected decisions of the others with a strength Ji, which
represents the social influence on his own decision. In [12],
mimetic individuals increase, while contrarians decrease,
their willingness to adopt the innovation proportionally
to the fraction of adopters n, with weight Ji = J = 1 for
all i. In other models [9,10], individuals are susceptible to
the majority, meaning that the willingness to adopt are
proportional to n− 1/2 instead of n.
As it stands, the model has four parameters: A, R, J ,
and s. We can get rid of J by using it as a normalization
factor for the others, as in [2,8]. In the following we mea-
sure all the values in terms of the strength of the social
interactions, J , and define
d ≡ A−R
J
, ui ≡ ri
J
, u0 ≡ r0
J
, σ ≡ s
J
(1)
Notice that this normalization was implicit in [12], where
most of the time it was assumed that J=1.
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The pay-offs of the model [12] are:
piMi = d− ui + n−i if i is mimetic, (2a)
piCi = d− ui − n−i if i is contrarian, (2b)
where n−i is the fraction of adopters without counting
individual i:
n−i =
1
N − 1
∑
k 6=i
ωk, (3)
with ωk = 1 if k is an adopter and zero otherwise.
When calculating the expected pay-offs we can check
each individual at random and immediately update his
decision according to the sign of his pay-off. In this case
the expected pay-off is equal to the actual one. On the
other hand we can perform a synchronous updating of all
agents at once. In the later case agents determine their
pay-offs taking into account the last value of the number
of adopters, n, but this value is refreshed after all agents
have been checked. So, the expected and the actual pay-
offs may be different after the updating. We will discuss
this point in further detail in the next section.
If adopters are not allowed to change their minds, as
in the model considered in [12], only the actual pay-offs
of non-adopters are important for the dynamics; however,
the equilibrium properties of the present model depend
both on adopters and non-adopters pay-offs. In the limit
of large populations with large numbers of adopters we
may replace N − 1 ≈ N , drop down the constraint k 6= i
in the equation above and approximate n−i by the bare
fraction of adopters n:
n−i ≈ n ≡ 1
N
∑
k
ωk. (4)
Individuals adopt the new technology whenever their
expected pay-offs are positive. The adoption dynamics
may become quite complex upon introduction of contrar-
ians that decide according to the majority rule [12]. Here
we include the possibility of coming back from previous
decisions, thus, individuals will abandon innovation if the
pay-off is negative. No doubts or delays are allowed in this
version of the model. The results of the present and the
previous [12] models are compared and discussed in the
following, that is, when adoption can be reverted or not.
When considering a large number of agents we can take
the limit N →∞. Introducing the fraction of adopters (3)
in equations (2), and assuming that the idiosyncratic nor-
malized resistance to adopt ui are quenched random vari-
ables of probability density P(u), the adoption probability
(the probability of positive pay-off) in the limit N → ∞
is
P (ω = 1|M) =
∫ d+n
−∞
P(u)du (5a)
P (ω = 1|C) =
∫ d−n
−∞
P(u)du (5b)
where M stands for mimetic and C for contrarian agents.
If the fraction of adopters at time t is n(t), the adopters’
dynamics is given by the following equation:
n(t+ 1) = (1− f)
∫ d+n(t)
−∞
P(u)du+ f
∫ d−n(t)
−∞
P(u)du
=
∫ d+n(t)
−∞
P(u)du− f
∫ d+n(t)
d−n(t)
P(u)du (6)
In the absence of contrarians, f = 0, the phase diagram
of the model is well known [2,3,8]. The stationary states
satisfy
n =
∫ d+n
−∞
P(u)du (7)
which is easily solved (see [8]).
In the following sections we include contrarians and re-
pentants, we assume pay-offs given by equations (2) and
we include the possibility of changing decisions for both
mimetic and contrarian agents. Agents adopt if the ex-
pected pay-off is positive and do not adopt otherwise.
Moreover, those that have adopted previously may go back
to no-adoption (repentants) if the actual pay-off turns out
to be negative. We analyze two particular distributions
P(u), the uniform distribution and the logistic one.
3 Uniform distribution
In this section, we present first results of simulations and
then we discuss analytic results for a uniform distribution,
i.e. P(u) = (2u0)−1 in [−u0, u0] and P(u) = 0 elsewhere.
We will compare the results of this model with the ones
presented in [12], thus we adopt the same value of the
parameters of that paper: i.e. we consider u0 = 0.5 so
that P(u) = 1. We also restrict the comparison to the
results in ref. [12] where J = 1, so we can consider the
variables already normalized.
3.1 Numerical results
When performing the simulations we consider two dif-
ferent dynamics, corresponding to synchronous and non-
synchronous updates. In the case of synchronous Parallel
Dynamics (PD), the pay-offs are evaluated for all agents
at the same time, then the status of each agent is changed
or not accordingly to their pay-off and thereafter the new
fraction of adopters, n, is updated. In the Monte Carlo se-
quential dynamics (MC), one agent is selected at random
and its status is updated depending on its pay-off, then the
number of adopters is immediately adjusted. This process
is repeated N times, which corresponds to one MC step.
The reason for considering these two dynamics is that the
first one (PD) is better adapted to be compared with an-
alytical results, while MC simulations probably provides
a better description of the changes in real societies. The
difference between the two dynamics is that in the MC
method a sequential update is performed, which means
that the number of adopters changes in a continuous way
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during each MC step, while in the PD case the number of
adopters is updated at the end of each step, after evaluat-
ing the pay-offs of all agents. A second difference between
the two types of dynamics is that with the PD procedure
all agents are visited, while in MC dynamics they may
not.
In order to illustrate the dynamics let us first consider
a very simple case with just two agents, N = 2, and the
three possible combinations: two mimetics, one mimetic
and one contrarian, and two contrarians. We choose pa-
rameters such that for both agents d is slightly higher
than ui, for example d = 0.01 and u1 = u2 = 0. The
results are exhibited on Fig. 1 (black filled squares corre-
spond to PD and red open circles to MC dynamics). In
the case of two mimetic agents, both of them will adopt
immediately and no further changes are observed, the sys-
tem arrives at a fixed point. With one mimetic and one
contrarian, both agents adopt in the first time step but
then only the mimetic remains as adopter. The system
gets to a fixed point with n = 0.5. In the cases above the
description corresponds strictly to PD while some random
variations are possible with MC dynamics. An interesting
time evolution arises when there are two contrarians be-
cause both of them adopt when n = 0, but as soon as they
adopt, n−i = 1/2 (notice that for small values of N , the
approximation given by Eq. 4 is not valid), so the contrar-
ian’s pay-off becomes negative and at the next evaluation
both become non-adopters. Therefore, the system exhibits
a strictly periodic behavior in parallel simulations. In MC
simulations, however, there are no oscillations: after the
first agent adopts, when the second is selected, it will not
adopt because its pay-off will be negative, so the evolution
stops at 50% of adopters.
0
0.5
1
PD
MC
0
0.5
1
n
0 5 10 15
Time (steps)
0
0.5
1
(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 1. Case of two agents: (a) Two mimetics, the final
value of n is n = 1; (b) one mimetic and one contrarian, n
quickly converges to n = 0.5; (c) two contrarians, the system
exhibits oscillations. Black squares correspond to PD and open
red circles to MC dynamics. In all cases, d = 0.01 and u1 =
u2 = 0.
Let us now consider the case with an intermediate
number of agents, N = 100; henceforth we use the ap-
proximation given by Eq.(4). In Fig. 2, it can be verified
that when the fraction of contrarians is large, f = 0.9, the
system exhibits oscillations in the parallel dynamics case,
while there are no oscillations with Monte Carlo dynamics.
For a lower fraction of contrarians, f = 0.5, oscillations
are of smaller amplitude and disappear for f ≤ 0.2.
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(a)
Figure 2. Fraction of adopters as a function of time for
N = 100 agents and different values of the fraction of con-
trarians f : (a) f = 0.2, no oscillations; (b) f = 0.5, small
amplitude oscillations; and (c) f = 0.9, large amplitude sus-
tained oscillations. Black squares correspond to PD and open
red circles to MC dynamics. In all cases, d = 0.4 and u0 = 0.5.
For an even larger number of agents, N = 107, oscilla-
tions always disappear in the long term. Even for a high
proportion of contrarians, f = 0.9, and with parallel dy-
namics, oscillations decay after a short transient, as can
be seen in Fig. 3. For a lower fraction of contrarians, os-
cillations are very short lived; for f = 0.5, for instance, no
more than three oscillations are seen in Fig. 3b. The pre-
vious results, all put together, suggest that for uniform
distribution of resistance to adoption —which is a raw
simplification of the society representation—, oscillations
are possible for a large number of contrarians, but are a
finite size, transient effect. We have investigated the exis-
tence, or not, of oscillations, and it seems that the critical
number of agents is around N ≈ 10000.
It is also interesting to investigate the effect of the ad-
vertising. The values considered, d = 0.4 may be too high.
It can be argued that a too high value of the incentive to
adopt could have a role in the appearance, or not, of oscil-
lations. And it has. In order to check this we try a lower
value of the incentive, d = −0.2. As u goes from −0.5 to
+0.5 that value of d implies that 30% of the agents have an
idiosyncrasy below d, i.e. 30% are potential early adopters.
As we are interested in possible oscillations we focus on
a high concentration of contrarians, f = 0.9, and three
system sizes, N = 2, N = 100, and N = 107. The results
are shown in Fig. 4 where a clear feature can be seen: the
asymptotic values for the average fraction of adopters are
much lower (n ≈ 0.15) than in the case of d = 0.4. This
is expected because the advertising is what promotes the
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Figure 3. Fraction of adopters as a function of time for
N = 107 agents and different values of the fraction of con-
trarians f : (a) f = 0.2, no oscillations; (b) f = 0.5, very short
lived oscillations; and (c) f = 0.9, transient oscillations. Black
squares correspond to PD and open red circles to MC dynam-
ics. The other parameters in all cases are d = 0.4 and u0 = 0.5.
adoption in the first place. But on the other hand the os-
cillatory behavior is very similar to previous results with
a bigger value of d, so our conclusions regarding the oscil-
latory behavior (and the existence or not of oscillations)
are robust against a change of the advertising. However,
if the width of the distribution is narrower, no oscillations
appear for low values of d.
Note that the effect of the “repentants” with the asso-
ciated cycle dynamics is only possible if f > 0. If there are
no contrarians, even if it is possible to repent, no agent will
do it because for a mimetic the pay-off can not decrease.
In other words, cycles are only possible if both, contrari-
ans and repentants, are present in the system. Moreover,
the effect of contrarians modifies the number of adopters,
and this change may induce mimetics to abandon the in-
novation. We finally remark that in this section we have
restrained our simulations to the parameters utilized in
ref. [12]. In particular, we have chosen u0 = 0.5. If a nar-
rower distribution of the idiosyncratic resistance to adopt
is considered, stable oscillations may appear for relatively
high values of the advertising. In the next section we show,
as an example, that such is the case for u0 = 0.25 and
P(u) = 2 (see Fig.6). Moreover, the effect of the width
of the distribution on the existence of oscillations will be
discussed in detail in section 4, as the logistic distribution
is simpler to be treated.
3.2 Analytic Results
In this section we present analytic mean field results and
compare them with numerical simulations of the preced-
ing section. As the analytic calculations implicitly assume
N →∞ we will compare them with the numerical results
for the big size system, i.e., N = 107.
Due to the compact support of P, the possible (nor-
malized) pay-offs as a function of n (see Eq. 2 and Fig. 5)
0
0.5
PD
MC
0
0.5
n
0 5 10 15
Time (steps)
0
0.5
(b)
(c)
(a)
Figure 4. Fraction of adopters as a function of time for a large
fraction of contrarians (f = 0.9), but a low value of advertising
(d = −0.2). Results for different system sizes: (a) N = 2, (b)
N = 100, and (c) N = 107. Black squares correspond to PD
and open red circles to MC dynamics. The qualitative behavior
is the same as in Fig. 2 and 3 with the same value of f , but a
bigger value of d.
are bounded by
piMmax(n) = d+ u0 + n
piMmin(n) = d− u0 + n
piCmax(n) = d+ u0 − n
piCmin(n) = d− u0 − n
(8)
and the fixed point equations of the dynamics, n(t+ 1) =
n(t) = n are:
n =nM + nC ; (9a)
nM =(1− f)
∫ max[0,piMmax(n)]
max[0,piMmin(n)]
P(u)du (9b)
nC =f
∫ max[0,piCmax(n)]
max[0,piCmin(n)]
P(u)du (9c)
that must be solved for n. We call nM the number of
adopters who are mimetic and nC those who are contrar-
ian.
There are different regimes that have to be analyzed
separately, depending on the signs of the extreme pay-
offs at n = 0 and at n = 1. To illustrate this point we
show on Fig. 5 the extreme pay-offs as a function of the
number of adopters, n, for d = 0.4 and u0 = 0.5. Blue
lines are extreme pay-offs for mimetics and red lines for
contrarians. The area with positive pay-off correspond to
the number of mimetics (blue ones) and contrarians (red
ones) but one should make attention to the fact that these
areas are weighted with the factors (1 − f) for mimetics,
and f for contrarians. When f = 0.5 both areas have
the same weight. In this case, starting with n = 0 the
number of adopters after the first step is of the order of
n = 0.9. But with such a high number of adopters most of
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the contrarians will defect the innovation and the number
of adopters will fall to n = 0.5 in the second step. After
that, the number of adopters increases again, and then
decreases to finally converge to an intermediary value of
n = 0.6. These decaying oscillations converging to n = 0.6
are also observed in the numerical results, on Fig. 3(b)
0 . 0 0 . 2 0 . 4 0 . 6 0 . 8 1 . 0- 1 . 5
- 1 . 0
- 0 . 5
0 . 0
0 . 5
1 . 0
1 . 5
2 . 0
 
 
n 3
pi
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m a x
pi
C
m i n
pi
M
m i n
extr
eme
 pay
offs
n
pi
M
m a x
n 2
Figure 5. Extreme pay-offs as a function of the number of
adoppters,n, for the uniform distribution with d = 0.4, u0 =
0.5. pi lines are extreme pay-offs, blue lines for mimetics and
red lines for contrarians. In general they are given by Eq. 8, in
this case by Eq. 11.
We consider now the points where the extreme pay-
offs change sign by solving Eqs. 9 for the pay-off equal to
zero:
n1 = −d− u0
n2 = −d+ u0
n3 = d+ u0 = −n1
n4 = d− u0 = −n2
(10)
Two of these points, n2 and n3, are also indicated on
Fig. 5; piMmax(n) is always positive and pi
C
min(n) always neg-
ative, so n1 and n4 are both negative and are not solutions.
In the general case we can state that u0 > 0, n2 > n1 and
n3 > n4, but depending on the relative values of d and
u0, n3 may be larger or smaller than n2. Here we would
like just to analyze the two cases that we have simulated
numerically: d = 0.4 and d = −0.2, both with u0 = 0.5. In
the first case (d = 0.4) one has the following boundaries:
piMmax(n) = 0.9 + n
piMmin(n) = −0.1 + n
piCmax(n) = 0.9− n
piCmin(n) = −0.1− n
(11)
Those boundaries are the ones plotted on Fig. 5. The
boundary piMmax(n) is always positive, pi
M
min(n) is positive
for n > 0.1, piCmax(n) is positive if n < 0.9 and pi
C
min(n) is
always negative, so in the corresponding contrarian inte-
gral (eq. 9c) the lower bound is always 0. The fixed point
can be evaluated using Eqs. 9. Considering f = 0.5 in
those equations, it is easy to verify that the equilibrium
is in the region 0.1 ≤ n ≤ 0.9 and the result is n ≈ 0.63,
that coincides very well with the asymptotic limit showed
in Fig. 3b. For f = 0.9 the asymptotic value is n ≈ 0.48
that also coincides with the numerical result (Fig. 3c).
The figure also explains the oscillations before attaining
the fixed point, as described above.
In the case with d = −0.2, the boundaries are:
piMmax(n) = 0.3 + n
piMmin(n) = −0.7 + n
piCmax(n) = 0.3− n
piCmin(n) = −0.7− n
(12)
Now, the boundary piMmax(n) is always positive, pi
M
min(n)
is positive for n > 0.7, piCmax(n) is positive if n < 0.3
and piCmin(n) is always negative. Let’s examine the case
f = 0.9. If one assumes a trial value, nt, restricted to
nt > 0.3 there are no contrarians adopting and the num-
ber of adopters should be n = (1 − f)nt that is always
lower than nt, in contradiction with the hypothesis. So, n
must be lower than 0.3 and the solution is n ≈ 0.16 again
in agreement with the simulations (See Fig. 4c).
Finally, and as we said, sustained oscillations can be
obtained for a set of parameters such that 0 < n4 ≡ d −
u0 < n3 ≡ d + u0 < 1, provided that both, u0 and d
be small enough. We show in Fig. 6 the extreme pay-
offs obtained analytically for d = 0.6 and u0 = 0.25. The
interpretation of this figure is the same as the one done for
Fig. 5. Moreover, the inset of Fig. 6 shows the numerical
result for the same values of parameters and f = 0.7. It
can be observed that the fraction of adopters as a function
of time for parallel update dynamics present oscillations,
in accordance with the analytical result.
4 Logistic distribution
While the uniform distribution is simpler than other dis-
tributions, the discontinuity at the borders generates some
complications particularly for the analytic calculations.
Also, one may imagine that the distribution of idiosyn-
crasies in a real society exhibit a concentration of values
around the mean value and a relatively low concentration
in the extremes. Taking these points into consideration
one could envisage the use of a Gaussian distribution, as
most of the values of the resistance to adopt will be dis-
tributed within a bell-shape of a few standard deviations
width. However, the integral of the Gaussian is not ana-
lytic. So, to avoid the cumbersome complications raised by
the uniform and Gaussian distributions, we consider here-
after a bell-shaped logistic distribution of the resistances
to adopt, P(ui), that is continuous and has infinite sup-
port. The probability density of the logistic distribution
is:
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Figure 6. Extreme pay-offs as a function of the number of
adopters, n, for the uniform distribution with d = 0.6, u0 =
0.25. pi lines are extreme pay-offs, blue lines for mimetics and
red lines for contrarians. In general they are given by Eq. 8.
Inset: Numerical results of the fraction of adopters as a function
of time in the parallel update dynamics for N = 107 (d = 0.6,
u0 = 0.25, and f = 0.7).
P(u) = β
2 cosh2(β u)
. (13)
with its variance given by
σ = pi
2 β
√
3
.
Following the practice of the previous section, we present
first the numerical results.
4.1 Numerical Results
We have performed different simulations with the logistic
distribution given by Eq. 13. The results are presented in
Figs. 7, 8, 9, and 10. When the simulation is performed
in parallel (PD), permanent oscillations may appear. This
is the case for intermediate values of the advertising, d,
and relatively high values of the fraction of contrarians,
f . This can be verified in Fig. 7 where we have repre-
sented a threshold value of the fraction of contrarians fc,
above which oscillations appear, as a function of the ad-
vertising d. Notice that there are no oscillations for d < 0
or for high values of d. Oscillations are present in a region
of values of d around d = 1, i.e. when the advertising is
as strong as the social interaction; oscillations are cycles
of period two and arises because contrarians adopt when
the number of adopters is low, but abandon the innova-
tion when the number of adopters is high. However some
mimetics may follow the contrarian’s behavior. The am-
plitude of the oscillations decreases when decreasing f or
when d is smaller or bigger than 1 (See Fig. 7). The region
where stable oscillations occur is larger the narrower the
width of the distribution of idiosyncrasies, σ.
We have represented in Figs. 8 and 9 the time evolu-
tion of the number of adopters exhibiting the oscillations,
when they happen, or the convergence to a fixed point
when there are no oscillations. When performing Monte
Carlo simulations there are no oscillations in none of the
cases. Figure 10 summarizes the numerical results for the
logistic distribution. Red curves (dashed) correspond to
the final number of adopters (fixed points) when perform-
ing MC simulations, while black curves correspond to Par-
allel Dynamics (PD). In the later case, oscillations may be
observed above a critical value of the fraction of contrari-
ans. When there are no oscillations, the results for PD and
MC simulations coincide. When oscillations are present,
PD results are different from MC results, and the plot
shows bot the extreme amplitude of the oscillations and,
in between, the average value of the number of adopters.
0 . 0 0 . 2 0 . 4 0 . 6 0 . 8 1 . 0 1 . 20 . 0
0 . 5
1 . 0
 =  0 =  0 . 0 5 =  0 . 1 5 =  0 . 2 5 =  0 . 4 0
 
 
  f c
d
Figure 7. Thresholds value of the fraction of contrarians above
which oscillations appear. The curves correspond to different
values of the width of the logistic distribution σ, as indicated.
We have represented just positive values of d as there are
no oscillations for negative values. The curves go through a
minimum that is lower the narrower the distribution. Notice
that the oscillations disappear when the advertising is slightly
higher than d = 1
4.2 Analytic results
The dynamics of adoption, given by equation (6), is
n(t+ 1) = (1− f)F(d+ n(t)) + fF(d− n(t)) (14)
where F(u) is the cumulative distribution
F(u) =
∫ u
−∞
P(x)dx = 1
1 + e−2βu
. (15)
The fixed points may be obtained by solving the tran-
scendental equation
n = y1(n) =
1− f
1 + e−2β(d+n)
+
f
1 + e−2β(d−n)
(16)
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Figure 8. Temporal behavior of the fraction of adopters for
the logistic distribution with σ = 0.25, d = 0.4, and different
values of the fraction of contrarians f : (a) f = 0.2, (b) f = 0.5,
and (c) f = 0.9. Results are for a large number of agents, N =
107. Open red circles correspond to the MC simulations and
black squares to PD simulations. In the PD case it is possible
to see the oscillations in the number of adopters for a high
concentration of contrarians. We have considered much longer
times than those represented in the figure and the oscillations
are stable.
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Figure 9. Temporal behavior for the logistic distribution with
σ = 0.25, f = 0.9 and two different values of the parameter
d (the normalized effective marketing): (a) d = −0.2 and (b)
d = 0.1. Oscillations in the number of adopters are obtained if
d > 0.
through the intersections of the function y1(n) with the
line y2(n) = n. Fig. 11 presents some examples for differ-
ent parameter values.
Fig. 11 represents a plot of y1(n) and the line y2(n) =
n. The intersections correspond to the fixed points and
are stable solutions provided that y′1 ≡ dy1dn < 1 . However,
solutions with |y′1| ≡ |dy1dn | > 1 are unstable, and we are
then obliged to consider a second iteration, i.e., y1(y1(n)).
The solutions for this second iteration are represented on
Fig. 12: if more than one intersection is present, the upper
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Figure 10. This figure summarizes the numerical results for
the logistic distribution of idiosyncrasies with σ = 0.25. All
four panels exhibit the fraction of adopters as a function of
the fraction of contrarians for four different values of d: (a)
d = 0.1, (b) d = 0.4, (c) d = 0.7, and (d) d = 1.0. As expected,
the number of adopters decreases when the number of contrar-
ians increases. The red curves (dashed) correspond to Monte
Carlo simulations and the black ones to a parallel dynamics.
An oscillatory behavior is obtained only for parallel dynamics
and the black lines correspond to the average value of the os-
cillations, while the shadowed areas indicates the amplitude of
the oscillations. Both dynamics exhibit identical results for low
and intermediate values of f , but there exists a critical value of
f when the parallel dynamics exhibits period two oscillations.
When increasing d the region of oscillations increases up to
d = 0.7 and then decreases for d = 1.0. When d < 0 there are
no oscillations and both dynamics produce the same results.
and lower intersections correspond to the extreme value of
the oscillations.
The comparison between numerical and analytical so-
lutions is discussed in detail in the caption of Figs. 11
and 12. We find a very good agreement of both solutions,
then, there is no need of further discussion of this point.
We will concentrate in the next section in the discussion
of the results and comparison with a previous model [12].
5 Discussion and Conclusions
One of the interesting points of the present contribution is
that the temporal behavior of the adoption of innovations
is very sensitive to the width of the distribution of the
resistance to adopt ui. In the case of a wide uniform dis-
tribution, as the one utilized in ref [12], oscillations appear
as a transient state but in the end the system converges
to a fixed point. On the other side, with narrower uniform
distributions of ui, sustained oscillations appear, which
are produced by the contrarians, whereas mimetic agents
hardly change their decision. It could be argued that this
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Figure 11. Fixed points of y1(n). The fixed points correspond to the intersections of y1(n) and y2(n) (indicated by the
dot-dashed gray line in the figure). When the absolute value of the derivative is lower than one, the solutions are stable and
correspond to a fixed point of the dynamics. The three panels show different cases for different values of the parameter d of
the logistic distribution of idiosyncrasies: (a) For d = −0.2 the derivatives at the intersections are always |y′1| < 1, thus no
oscillations are expected. (b) When d = 0.1 three possible stable intersections appear in each case, and the values roughly
correspond to the numerical results plotted on Fig. 10(a). (c) When d = 0.4 and f = 0.2 the stable solution correspond to
n ≈ 0.8 that coincides with the numerical solution (See Fig. 10(b)). For f = 0.5, n ≈ 0.5 that also coincides with both PD
and MC simulations. Finally, for f = 0.9 the solution is unstable (|y′1| > 1). However the fixed point corresponds to the value
obtained with MC simulations (see Fig. 10), while PD simulations indicated the existence of oscillations.
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Figure 12. Fixed points of y1(y1(n)) with y2(n) (gray dot-
dashed line). We have plot just the case with d = 0.4. It is
possible to observe that for f = 0.2 and f = 0.5 there is
just one intersection, that corresponds to the stable solutions
previously obtained. For f = 0.9 there are three intersections.
The middle one corresponds to the fixed point of y1(n) while
the other two represent the extremes of the oscillations. These
extreme values are approximately 0.12 and 0.9 and correspond
to the extreme value of the oscillations in the PD simulations,
see Fig. 8(c).
kind of distribution is not representative of social systems.
However, when the distribution is bell shaped, as it is the
case of the logistic distribution presented in section 4, we
obtain similar results. That is, stable long term oscillations
may appear for intermediate values of the advertising, d,
or a large fraction of contrarians, f , as it is evident in
Fig. 7. While a high number of contrarians may be unreal
considering a novel technology, that could be the case re-
garding brand choices, for example (iPhone vs. Samsung).
In any case, Fig. 7 shows that oscillations may appear
with a relatively low fraction of contrarians, provided the
advertising is strong: see for example that for a narrow
distribution of idiosyncrasies (σ = 0.05) and for d ≈ 0.95
the threshold is of the order of f ≈ 0.15. Also, the co-
existence of contrarians with the possibility of changing
decisions makes the final total number of adopters lower
than in the case with no regrets [12]. To check this point
we have represented in Fig. 13 the present results for the
uniform distribution of ui together with those of Ref. [12].
It is possible to see that the shape is similar in both cases,
but when the decision is “reversible” the final adoption is
lower than when not. To produce this comparison we con-
sidered the uniform distribution of idiosyncrasies because
it was the one used in Ref. [12].
The presence of repentants and contrarians have the
effect of reducing the final number of adopters. Also, oscil-
lations may appear when the distribution of resistances to
adopt is smaller than 1, i.e. smaller than the social inter-
action, J . Also, such cycles are only possible if both, con-
trarians and repentants, are present. Concerning the oscil-
lations, they are interesting but somehow artificial, as they
mainly arise from contrarians that regret their decision. In
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Figure 13. Comparison between the results of ref. [12] (with-
out repentants) and the present ones with repentants: final
number of adopters for two values of d (d = 0.4, squares, and
d = −0.2, circles). Filled symbols correspond to no repentants
and open ones with repentants (present contribution). Pairs
of curves display similar behavior with always lower values of
adoption for the case with repentants.
any case one expect that the first oscillations are the im-
portant ones, as it is not plausible that agents continue to
change their minds all the time. Regarding the fact that
the inclusion of contrarians and repentants reduces signif-
icantly the final fraction of adopters, a direct consequence
is that a stronger advertising campaign will be needed if it
seeks to impose innovation. Work in progress include the
presence of impulsive agents, i.e., people that can change
their technology without assessing whether it is conve-
nient. Preliminary results show that the introduction of
such agents in the model accelerates the adoption pro-
cess and increases the total number of adopters. In other
words, a small number of impulsive agents in a society
could be as efficient as a strong advertising.
We are also considering a dynamic distribution of id-
iosyncrasies, the effect of distributing the agents on a net-
work, and a non-linear term of social interaction that may
describe the effects of fashion: people adopt a new fash-
ion when there are a few followers but abandon when the
number of adopters increases.
Concluding, we would like to point out that, despite its
simplicity, this model reproduce some common features of
the innovation adoption process while allowing the study
of more realistic cases.
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